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Abstract 
At present most social protection programs in Latin American countries are financed by payroll taxes 
levied on the formal sector. Increasingly, some countries are both extending some benefits similar to 
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value added tax. In this paper we consider the efficiency of payroll taxes compared to value-added taxes 
as a way of financing expanded social programs in countries with large informal sectors.  To do so, we 
construct a simple formal model that indicates, in general, that a revenue-neutral move from payroll to 
value-added taxes will reduce informality and increase wages, output and welfare.  While the issue is not 
a simple one, and the specific conditions in each country need careful consideration, this analysis suggests 
that in countries with large informal sectors it is probably best to finance incremental expansions of social 
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1 Introduction
At present social insurance (SI) systems in most Latin American countries
are financed primarily through taxes on labour, including both payroll taxes
that finance contributory SI regimes and other taxes on wages and labour
income that finance a broader array of social programs. Payroll taxes that
are explicitly linked to social insurance programs are levied at rates ranging
from a low of about 8 percent in Mexico to a high of about 45 percent in
Colombia. By definition, these taxes are applied only to the formal sector
of the economy. Similarly, many of the benefits from the social programs
financed by these taxes may be claimed only by those who are or have been
employed in the formal sector and have therefore contributed to funding
the programs, although there is often no tight connection between taxes
paid and benefits received.1 Issues related both to contributory schemes
(and the extent to which they are regarded by workers as benefit taxes)
1Details of country programs may be found in Social Security Administra-
tion 2010 (available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2008-
2009/americas/index.html).
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and to voluntary arrangements are discussed elsewhere. In the present pa-
per, we focus primarily on the efficiency of payroll taxes (PRT) compared to
value-added taxes (VAT) as a means of financing social programs in coun-
tries with important informal sectors.
Increasingly, some countries (e.g. Colombia) are both providing some
benefits from the social protection system on a more universal basis and
are supplementing contributory finance to some extent from general rev-
enues. This expansion of social protection regimes in Latin America raises
closely linked questions with respect to the link between taxes paid and
benefits received and the effects of the labour tax burden on employment
and productivity. As social insurance expands beyond its original contribu-
tory basis, a key question is whether it should continue to be financed pri-
marily or exclusively through payroll and other taxes on labour, or whether
efficiency and equity would be enhanced by shifting reliance to general
revenues of government – and potentially to other tax bases, of which the
value-added tax is the most obvious candidate. To answer such questions,
it is important to compare the effects of such finance with the alternative
of increasing either the rate or coverage (or both) of existing payroll taxes.
To set the stage for such analysis, this paper begins with a brief overview
of both the current SI financing arrangements and the general tax sys-
tems in a number of major Latin American countries. In most countries,
SI is financed to a considerable extent by dedicated payroll taxes, most
of which are imposed on employers rather than on employees. Despite
these dedicated revenues, most SI systems are far from self-financing and a
substantial fraction of general revenues also ends up financing SI systems.
Nonetheless, the very limited coverage of SI regimes has increasingly led
countries to devote still more general revenue to expanded social protec-
tion (SP) systems. In most countries the marginal source of general rev-
enue is usually the VAT, which is often both the largest and one of the most
elastic revenue sources available.
In considering possible alternative financing arrangements for SI, one
important issue is to assess how the current system compares to such alter-
natives in terms of such standard criteria as economic incidence, equity, and
efficiency. In particular, in view of the marked and persistent importance
of the informal sector in most Latin American countries, it is critical to un-
derstand the likely effect of alternative SI financing on the relative growth
of employment in the formal and informal sectors as well as the possible
consequences of increasing (or reducing) informality on the pattern and
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level of economic growth.2
Levy (2008) and others have argued that current SI payroll tax systems,
together with non-contributory benefit programs available to workers in
the informal sector, constitute a subsidy to the informal sector which sup-
presses development of the formal sector and results in productivity losses.
To remove this bias, Levy has proposed financing SI from the VAT instead
of through contributory payroll taxes. These proposals have been contro-
versial. Several authors, most notably Emran and Stiglitz (2005), have
criticized VATs for encouraging tax evasion and the informal economy in
developing countries.3 As such, the notion that increased reliance on VAT
may be a solution to informality may appear surprising. Sorting out these
differences is key to understanding the effect of SI financing on productiv-
ity. These issues are explored to some extent with respect to VAT, for exam-
ple, in such studies as de Paula and Scheinkman (2008, 2009) on Brazil,
Pomeranz (2010) on Chile, and, with respect to both VAT and payroll taxes
by Anton and Hernandez (2010) on Mexico. What is more, and of consid-
erable concern to governments, if the two taxes have different bases that
may grow at different rates and are subject to evasion to different degrees,
alternative forms of SI financing may have important revenue implications.
At first, the comparison between payroll and value-added taxation seems
complex, since the legal and economic basis of the taxes is so different. Pay-
roll taxes are levied on producers; while the legal incidence of VAT is also
on producers, it is commonly viewed as a tax on consumption rather than
production. As a tax on domestic production, the payroll tax is a tax on
an origin basis, whereas almost all VATs are levied on a destination basis,
zero-rating exports and fully taxing imports for domestic consumption. As
such, the two taxes may in principle have different effects on the develop-
ment of the tradable and non-tradable sectors and on the pattern and level
of economic growth. Finally, the different base and the invoice-and-credit
structure of the VAT mean that the incentives for tax evasion and distortions
to formal sector production are potentially quite different than for payroll
taxes. Some recent research (e.g. Antón and Henández, 2010) has made
progress in elucidating certain aspects of this comparison, but some of the
2This has been the subject of considerable work by the World Bank – see, for instance,
Perry et al. (2003) – as well as in country studies as Arias et al. (2010) and Hanson
(2010).
3See Keen (2008) for an alternative approach stressing the extent to which VAT may
actually tax rather than favour the informal sector.
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fundamental economic issues may remain obscure.
For this reason, in Section 4 of the paper we construct a simple formal
model of the effects of labour and value-added taxes, contrasting in partic-
ular their incidence on wages, their implications for government revenue
and for equity, and their effects on the informal economy.
The starting point of our model is a fundamental equivalence result: in
a closed economy, and in the absence of informality, a consumption-based
VAT is equivalent to a payroll tax plus a tax on the existing capital stock of
firms and on other rents. In other words, in this idealized framework, the
two taxes have identical effects on labour markets, but the VAT raises addi-
tional revenues over a transition period from taxing quasi-rents to installed
capital.
Thus far, the results of the model are standard: VAT is a more efficient
tax than payroll taxation in the model because its base is broader than the
payroll tax base. One implication is that VAT raises the same revenues at
a lower tax rate than the payroll tax. However, the story becomes more
complicated when we consider informality. In the model, we suppose that
firms and workers may move between the formal sector (subject to VAT
and payroll taxes) and the informal sector (not subject directly to either
tax). The base of VAT is broader than payroll taxes to the extent that VAT
taxes rents (and quasi-rents) of formal sector firms. Therefore, incentives
to enter the informal sector are greater under VAT than under a payroll tax
at the same statutory rate. In spite of this tradeoff between revenues and
efficiency of the tax, we show that there exists a revenue-neutral reform
from payroll taxation to VAT that increases national output and welfare in
the model.
However, the analysis differs when various real world complications
are considered. For example, under (destination-based) VATs, exports are
zero-rated and imported goods are subject to taxation. This changes the
efficiency effects of the two taxes, and may change the incentives for in-
formality, to the extent that formal-sector firms are more or less involved
in the export sector of the economy. Effects may also differ if, for exam-
ple, markets are very imperfect and the infra-marginal rents taxed by VAT
are relatively large, if capital is relatively more mobile than labour (or vice
versa) between the formal and informal sectors and the elasticity of substi-
tution for capital and labour is different in the two sectors, or if VAT is more
regressive than the payroll tax and the existing income distribution is very
unequal. However, although these factors may be important to differing
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extents in different countries, on the whole the critical factors are (1) the
size of the factor market distortions created by the tax wedges (e.g. the
labour share in the VAT base) and (2) the relevant elasticities in the formal
and informal markets.
2 Financing SI in Latin America
Over the last few years, issues related to social protection (SP)– a term
encompassing both social insurance (SI) and social assistance (SA) – have
come to the forefront of policy discussion in Latin America, with the UN,
the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF, the OECD,
and many others contributing numerous reports and research papers to
the growing pile of documentation related to this topic.4 Several different
concerns underlie the marked recent expansion of policy discussion in this
area.
2.1 Current Concerns
Many Latin American countries introduced traditional compulsory social
insurance schemes financed by payroll taxes decades ago. As Mesa-Lago
(2008) notes, some countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Chile intro-
duced limited pension plans even before World War II; others including
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru followed in the 1950s; late-comers, like most
of the Central American countries, following in the 1960s and 1970s. The
coverage and benefits of these schemes varies considerably from country
to country (Social Security Administration 2010). In all cases, however, as
Table 1 shows, the social insurance system is financed, to varying extents,
through payroll taxes (“contributions”). On average, the level of these pay-
roll tax rates is 23%, although with wide variation from country to country
from a low of 8% in Mexico to a high of 45% in Colombia.
The literature offers several reasons for being concerned with the effi-
cacy of the SI systems now existing in Latin America. One obvious reason is,
as shown in Table 2, simply because almost none of the SI systems in Latin
America are “self-financing”. On average, less than 40% of social security
4For a sampling, see e.g. Economic Commission on Latin America (2006), Mesa-Lago
(2008), Riber, Robalino and Walker (2010), IMF (2010), and Da Costa et al. (2011).
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outlays are financed by contributory finance, with the result that close to
20% of general tax revenues in effect finance SI spending. As shown in Ta-
ble 2, there are of course wide differences from country to country, with the
SI financing deficit being particularly large in Argentina and Brazil. These
differences reflect both the differing scope and age of the SI systems in dif-
ferent countries and the reforms undertaken in a number of countries in
recent years, both in response to fiscal pressure and as part of the effort
to expand coverage in the face of continuing high levels of both inequality
and informality (see Table 3).5 Major reforms have taken place in Chile
and Argentina – originally in the early 1990s and more recently in the last
few years (Rofman, Fajnzlyber and Herrera 2010) as well as in Colombia
(Clavijo 2009) and to some extent in Bolivia, Mexico and Peru (Kritzer, Kay
and Sinha 2011).6
An additional reason for SI reform has been the desire to expand the
present limited coverage of SI schemes in most countries of the region. A
more important attack on the problem of the very limited access to such
SI-linked services as pensions and health, however, has been the rapid ex-
pansion in a number of countries of various forms of direct social assis-
tance (SA), such as noncontributory SI schemes (“social pensions”) and
conditional cash transfers (CCTs). In principle, SI and SA are quite differ-
ent, with the former directed at consumption-smoothing and the latter at
income redistribution but, as Ferreira and Robalino (2010) note, this dis-
tinction is so often blurred in practice that it has become common in Latin
America to lump SI and SA together under the label Social Protection (SP).
We focus here on such non-contributory SI reforms as funding pensions,
either universal or means-tested, out of general revenues and health in-
surance schemes targeted to the poor (Holzmann, Robalino and Takayama
2009). Some recent studies (Ortiz and Cummins 2011) suggest that these
schemes have already brought about noticeable improvements in terms of
5As Mesa-Lago (2008) notes, for example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile Costa Rica and
Uruguay led the way in developing SI systems, while Paraguay, Nicaragua, Honduras,
Guatemala, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic are late-comers.
6As Kritzer, Kay and Sinha (2011) discuss in detail, much of this reform activity has
taken the form (to look only at pensions) of moving away to varying degrees from the
traditional SI model of mandatory contributory financing through a central public agency
of defined benefit pensions to models that, again to varying extents, introduce more vol-
untary components in either the level or allocation of contributions and move to what is
in effect a defined contribution pension system. We shall not discuss such schemes further
here, however.
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both poverty reduction and inequality in some countries in the region.
While clearly motivated primarily by the basic distributional considera-
tions suggested by the inequality and poverty measures shown in Table 3,
these programs have also responded in part to the increasing perception
that the basic SI system was deeply flawed, given its limited coverage of
only the formal sector, the marked evasion even within that sector, and the
fact that transfers are regressive in that they do not go to the poor. In short,
as a detailed study of social transfers in eight countries concluded, the sys-
tem is in general both “grossly inefficient and regressive” (Lindert, Skoufias
and Shapiro 2006, p. 44).7
This result is not altered by the fact that to a considerable extent (see
Table 2) such transfers were in fact funded not by SI contributions but by
general revenues because in most countries the tax system is too limited
and – largely owing to the very limited role of the personal income tax
(Bird and Zolt 2005) – insufficiently progressive to effect any noticeable
degree of redistribution (Goñi, Lopez and Seven 2008).8 Not only are tax
burdens in the region relatively low but, unsurprisingly in light of the de-
pendence of most economies on commodities, revenues have demonstrated
high volatility in recent years (Fricke and Sussmith 2011).9
2.2 Economic aspects of payroll taxation
In short, there are macroeconomic and distributional problems with the
design and financing of SP programs in Latin America. What is more, the
recent expansion of such programs has accentuated concerns about the
possibly undesirable economic effects on labour markets, productivity and
growth of both sides of the SI equation – payroll tax (PRT) finance on
one hand and subsidized transfers on the other – particularly in economies
7The same point is made by Goñi, López and Sevén (2008).
8Similar conclusions emerge from the various country studies presented in Barreix,
Roca and Villela (2007) and the recent summary appraisal by Jimenez, Gomez Sabaini
and Podesta (2010).
9As Fricke and Sussmith (2011) show, for the region as a whole, although with consid-
erable variation from country to country, the long-run elasticity of income taxes is greater
than for VAT. However, since much of the higher elasticity is associated with the CIT, the
most important income tax in most countries, income tax revenues are also considerably
more volatile than VAT revenues. On the other hand, in Argentina, Mexico and Peru, VAT
is more elastic than social security contributions (PRT) while in Brazil the two are equally
elastic; only in Chile and Ecuador is PRT more elastic than VAT.
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with large informal sectors. Observations along such lines as the remark
by Goñi, Lopez and Seven (2008, p. 23) that “payroll taxes . . . encourage
informality and ultimately tend to detract from the revenue-raising ability
of the overall tax system” are common in the literature.10 Indeed, such
arguments are to a large extent simply an extension of the standard view
of the disincentive effects of the “labour tax wedge.” This wedge is often
defined to include “direct” taxes on labour, notably the personal income
tax on labour income and payroll taxes. It is probably more appropriate
to include consumption taxes also, since presumably workers respond to
changes in net real wages (OECD 2007). However, few empirical studies
do so. Levy (2008) took this long-standing argument about the disincentive
effect of PRT on employees further by arguing (particularly with respect to
Mexico) that not only did wage taxes imposed on formal sector workers
encourage informality but that the recent expansion of the subsidized pro-
vision of social services to informal sector workers reinforced the resulting
disincentives to economic growth and productivity.11 His proposed solu-
tion was essentially to replace payroll tax financing of social transfers by
general revenue financing and in particular (at least in the case of Mexico)
the VAT.
Of course, Levy (2008) was by no means the first to propose general
revenue financing of SI or even the first to propose that the source of such
finance should be the VAT. New Zealand, for example, has always financed
all of its extensive social transfers from general revenues, as for the most
part has Australia. Indeed, many countries finance first-pillar old-age pen-
sions (usually income-tested) from general revenues even when they also
have contributory financing of earnings-related pensions. Even countries
with long-established PRT financed SI schemes have recently considered
shifting some of the fiscal burden to general taxes, and in particular the
VAT, both because of concerns about unemployment and for macroeco-
nomic reasons. For example, a “social VAT” – that is, an additional VAT rate
earmarked to finance social purposes – was seriously discussed in France
recently (Besson 2007) and a somewhat similar proposal was made for the
Czech Republic (Dalsgaard 2008).12
10See, for example, Perry et al. (2003).
11This theme was subsequently picked up to a considerable extent in studies by interna-
tional agencies such as Pagés (2010) and Riber, Robalino and Walker (2010).
12For the most part, the analysis of the social VAT proposal in Besson (2007) as well as
such other contributions as Maarek (2008) took the form of simulations (including some
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Statutory incidence
As Table 1 shows, every country imposes part of the tax on employees and
part on employers; however, with the exceptions of Chile and Venezuela, in
most countries most payroll taxes (on average, 61%) are imposed on em-
ployers. This split financing of SI contributions may not be economically
significant in the sense that all taxes on wages are likely borne by workers in
the long run, but some evidence suggests that it may be considered relevant
in some respects by both employers and employees.13 More recently, there
has also been some discussion in the US of the possibly beneficial effects on
employment of reducing payroll taxes, although perhaps unsurprisingly in
the present US context there appears to have been little or no consideration
of making up the revenue loss through increases in other taxes. Interest-
ingly, the Congressional Budget Office suggested that the most effective –
in terms of increasing employment – way to cut SI taxes would be to reduce
the employer’s portion.14 Presumably on somewhat similar reasoning, as
part of its “Paying Tax” report on the investment climate in different coun-
tries, World Bank (2011) separates out the so-called “Labour TTR” shown
in Table 1, which is more or less the employer’s share of SI contribution as a
share of commercial profits (for a hypothetical firm), as if only that part of
the tax influenced business decisions. However, the arguments offered in
support of this position are neither very explicit nor particularly strong.15
Payroll taxes as benefit taxes
Similarly, the argument sometimes found in the SP literature that social
security “contributions” are not really taxes because they finance benefits
CGE analysis) that focused on the possible macroeconomic effects of this substitution on
the balance of payments and inflation, although some attention was also paid to short-run
effects on employment.
13Studies of payroll tax incidence in Latin American countries have yielded varying re-
sults, but as a rule suggest some shifting: see e.g. Cruces, Galiani, and Kidyba (2010),
Kugler and Kugler (2009), and Heckman and Pages (2004)
14For a summary of the recent US discussion, see Ainsworth (2011).
15Ainsworth (2011), though he presents no formal analysis, does a good job of criticiz-
ing this reasoning. Interestingly, he also notes that cutting PRT is in many ways identical
to cutting VAT and draws on some European experiments with VAT cuts to encourage em-
ployment to argue that probably the most effective approach would be to target PRT cuts
only to unemployed persons who enter employment.
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received by the contributors is weak in general. In contrast, the exclusion
of most informal workers from the scope of PRT means that, even with the
ceilings imposed on the wage bases subject to such taxes, they are almost
certainly progressive whether measured against income or consumption.
The stuff now in parens might be put in a note at this point, to read: Social
security contributions seem only rarely to be included in incidence analy-
sis, perhaps in the belief – mistaken in most Latin American countries – that
they are matched in some meaningful sense by SI benefits. The tendency
in most countries to impose most SI taxes on employers rather than em-
ployees (see Table 1) presumably reflects the view of politicians that voters
are likely to be most aware of the direct impact of the latter on their net
wages. Of course, while this may be largely true within the short-run hori-
zon within which most political decisions are made, it is much less likely
to be relevant in a long-run economic perspective. For these reasons, we
assume in this paper, as in most of the economic literature, both that SI con-
tributions can meaningfully be considered simply as a tax – the PRT âA˘S¸
and that the incidence and effects of PRT are similar regardless of whether
the tax is legally imposed on employer or employee.
In any case, the Levy (2008) proposal clearly touched a nerve not only
in Mexico but in other countries in the region in part because it not only
suggested a way to finance expanded SP – a distributionally desirable ob-
jective – but it would also reduce the damaging effect on productivity and
growth of the current PRT based SI financing structure. Such “double divi-
dends” are always attractive to both analysts and politicians. In the present
paper, however, we concentrate on the “cake” – the economic effect – rather
than the “frosting” – the distributional effect, in part because the evidence
in support of the former is much stronger and less country-specific.16
Informality
PRT has detrimental economic effects in Latin America not only because it
constitutes a major component of the labour tax wedge as usually defined
but in particular because it encourages informality, and informal firms are
16Even in the case of Mexico, Arias et al. (2010, p. 48) conclude that, while labor
taxation has led to greater informality and informality has definitely reduced productivity
growth in Mexico, there is ‘. . . little evidence that the introduction of social programs
targeted towards informal workers has played a major role in promoting informality.”
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not only in general small but also less productive than equally-sized formal
firms (Pagés, 2010). As La Porta and Shleifer (2008) argue, on the whole
the evidence appears to support this negative view of the economic effects
of increasing informality. Informal firms to a considerable extent appear
to self-select into the informal sector, with those at the lower end of the
underlying distribution of firm productivity (entrepreneurial or managerial
ability) joining the informal sector (de Paula and Scheinkman 2008). Once
there, although they gain by being able to dodge taxes, they find it more
costly and difficult to secure capital as Feltenstein and Shamloo (2011), de-
veloping some aspects of the argument in Gordon and Li (2009), have re-
cently argued. Informal sector firms are hence likely to do little investment
in either physical or human capital, thus dragging aggregate productivity
performance and the development of the economy’s growth potential down
(Arias et al. 2010).17
3 The choice of tax base
3.1 Payroll taxes and VAT: The policy landscape
At the other end of the world from the US both economically and geo-
graphically, some of the same arguments discussed in Ainsworth (2011)
have come up in a recent proposal in New Caledonia to replace PRT financ-
ing of social transfers by VAT – in effect, the French “social VAT” revived in
the south Pacific. Although both the factual and analytical setting in a re-
cent analysis of this proposal by Lagadec and Ris (2010) are very different
to that prevailing in Latin America, notably in the omission of any discus-
sion of the informal sector, in many ways this paper comes closer to dealing
with the specific issues we analyze here than anything else in the literature,
so one way to introduce the simple model set out in the next section may
be simply to review the Lagadec and Ris (2010) analysis and raise some
questions about it.
First, Lagadec and Ris (2010) consider, much as in the French case
17While the evidence on these links is still far from complete, utilizing a model of Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), Camacho and Conover (2010), although not focusing on informality,
find some evidence in Colombia that productivity was reduced by policy changes that
raised the costs to employers of formal sector labor and increased by changes that reduced
such costs.
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mentioned earlier, two possible disadvantages of VAT substitution – the
presumed greater regressivity of VAT and the possible inflationary effect.
Neither of these arguments appears to be a major issue in the case of most
Latin American countries. Although, as Smart and Bird (2009) and other
studies have shown, VATs are indeed usually passed forward to consumers,
there is little or no evidence, in either developed or developing countries
of any significant effect on general price levels.18
On the other hand, assuming full forward-shifting, VATs in most Latin
American countries are indeed mildly regressive in terms of income, al-
though they are mildly progressive when measured against consumption
(Barreix, Bes and Roca 2010). Moreover, the exclusion of most informal
workers from the scope of PRT means that, even with the ceilings imposed
on the wage bases subject to such taxes, they are almost certainly regres-
sive whether measured against income or consumption (although social
security contributions seem only rarely to be included in incidence anal-
ysis, perhaps in the belief – mistaken in most Latin American countries –
that they are matched in some meaningful sense by SI benefits. Although
only a limited amount can be said about such issues in general analytical
terms, empirical analysis of VAT-to-payroll tax substitution in the setting of
any particular country should presumably pay close attention to these po-
litically important distributional questions, while recognizing that the dis-
tributional outcomes shown in such analyses, no matter how data-intensive
or analytically sophisticated, often reflect as much or more the assumptions
made as the reality being examined. 19
Lagadec and Ris (2010) go on to suggest that substituting VAT for PRT
financing of SI will have three major advantages. First, it will expand the
revenue base. Second, it will increase employment by lowering labour
costs. And third, it will remove the trade distortion arising from the fact
that PRT affects export but not import prices. However, no formal analysis
supporting these arguments is offered; instead, the paper provides a simu-
lation of the effects under a particular set of assumptions. We discuss these
three advantages of VAT over PRT briefly below and more formally in the
next section.
To begin with, as a glance at the two right-hand columns of Table 3 may
18For a Mexican study, see Pagan, Soydemir and Tijerino-Guajardo (2001).
19For a good example, see the recent incidence study by Barriex, Roca, and Villela
(2007).
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suggest, the first of these points – the expanded revenue base under VAT
seems perhaps too obvious to be worth discussion. In fact, however, while
the point is basically correct, the issue is considerably more subtle than
such simple numerical manipulation suggests. For example, some evidence
suggests, in line with conventional wisdom (Bird and Gendron 2007) that
VAT is relatively easier to enforce effectively than “single point” taxes like
PRT (e.g. de Paula and Scheinkman 2009; Pomeranz 2010). Some aspects
of this differential enforcement in economies with informal sectors have re-
cently been explored in both theoretical and empirical terms. For example,
Boadway and Sato (2009) responding in part to a critique of VAT’s effects
in an economy with an informal sector by Emran and Stiglitz (2005) and
building on Keen (2008), show that since enforcement can affect the size
of the informal sector, the case for relying on VAT, which is easier to enforce
in the informal sector, is stronger. With respect to the specific case of Mex-
ico, Leal (2010) argues that fully effective VAT enforcement would expand
output by as much as 17% while Antón and Hernández (2010), using a
different model, similarly suggest that an expanded tax base would be one
likely outcome from a PRT-VAT substitution.
Finally, although this point does not so far seem to have received much
consideration in the Latin American discussion, attention should also be
paid to the “trade” effect of a VAT-PRT substitution, the third of the posi-
tive effects postulated by Lagadec and Ris (2010). As Cardi and Restout
(2010), like others, have noted, shifting all or some of the tax burden from
labour to consumption in a neoclassical open economy model will produce
heterogeneous sectoral responses operating largely through firm entry – re-
sponses which may be amplified by the increased labour elasticity resulting
from the tax shift. However, their model does not have an informal sector.
The simple model presented in the next section builds a simple framework
which – without delving too deeply into “the world of the second best” in
which most developing countries exist – analyzes such a tax substitution in
an open economy with an endogenously determined informal sector and
differential tax enforcement.
3.2 A conceptual framework
To summarize the foregoing discussion, the proposals of Levy (2008) and
the actual experience with policy reform in several countries suggest that a
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key question is whether SI is better financed through (contributory or non-
contributory) payroll taxes, or through a broader tax base like VAT. At first,
the choice between labour taxes and VAT seems rather stark, since the legal
base and structure of the taxes is so different. The previous economics
literature has however posited simple general equilibrium models of the
economy that elucidate the similarities and differences of the two taxes. In
brief, the key issues are:
1. Value-added versus payroll base: In a pure consumption VAT, essen-
tially all purchases are taxable, but taxable purchasers (businesses)
receive credits for taxes paid on material inputs and capital goods pur-
chased. The residual base of the value added tax is therefore labour
costs of production (payroll) plus the returns to other primary factors
of production in excess of the normal return to capital employed in pro-
duction. Of these, one may highlight in particular rents to land, quasi-
rents to old capital, and supranormal profits. As such, the base of an
ideal VAT is broader than that of the payroll tax. A revenue-neutral
shift from payroll tax to VAT therefore typically permits a reduction
in the statutory tax rate, and it may have different distributional im-
plications.
2. Destination versus origin: Viewed in this way, both taxes are taxes on
domestic production, rather than consumption. But most VATs apply
zero-rating to exported commodities, and fully tax imports. As such,
a VAT is typically a destination-based tax on domestic consumption,
whereas a PRT is an origin-based tax on domestic production. This
distinction is often held in policy circles to favour the VAT as an en-
hancement to “international competitiveness”. But this difference is
less important than it appears, since a switch from origin to destina-
tion bases will in principle generally result in changes in exchange
rates or domestic wage costs that render the two bases nearly equiv-
alent (e.g., Lockwood, de Meza, and Myles, 1994).
3. Incentives for informality: Levy (2008) emphasized that existing SI
systems entail a distortionary tax on formal sector employment that
implicitly favour (less productive) informal sector firms. In contrast,
Emran and Stiglitz (2005), and others, showed that VAT similarly
favoured informality. Clearly, both taxes (or any taxes, for that mat-
ter) create incentives for tax evasion, informality, and other economic
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distortions, but the nature and magnitude of these incentives differ
under VAT and PRT by virtue of their different legal and economic
structures. Comparing the two taxes in this dimension requires more
detailed analysis.
Despite the importance of the issue, there is yet little direct empirical
evidence on the real world effects of VAT on informality in the de-
veloping world. Keen and Lockwood (2010) study the effects of VAT
adoption on the overall efficiency of the tax system, as measured by
the ratio of tax revenues to GDP, and find that, while VAT reforms are
generally revenue-neutral, adoption by low-income countries is asso-
ciated with a small decline in revenue. As the authors recognize, this
association may reflect other changes coincident with VAT adoption
rather than the effects of induced informality; however, the result is
suggestive. Desai and Hines (2005) examine the impact of the VAT
on international trade in a cross-section of countries, finding that ex-
istence of VAT is associated with lower openness to trade, particularly
for low and middle income countries. In interesting recent work us-
ing Brazilian business microdata, De Paula and Sheinkman find that
informal businesses are more likely to have informal suppliers and
customers, a result that is consistent with the VAT chain effect on tax
evasion. Pomeranz (2010) examines field experiments in Chile that
shows how VAT non-compliance behaviour cascades through the sup-
ply chain. To date the differential effects of VAT and other tax bases
on informality have not been explored in the data.
These considerations suggest that the differences between labour tax-
ation and VAT are subtle. Sorting out the differences requires a formal
economic model. In the next section, we analyze the effects of a switch
from a payroll tax to VAT on real wages, productivity, trade, and the dis-
tribution of income in a simple general equilibrium model of a small open
economy. Our model includes a (simple) model of the incentives each tax
creates for firms in the formal and informal sectors, and it leads to clear
implications about the distributional and efficiency effects of a reform form
payroll taxation to VAT.
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4 A formal model
In a small open economy, a homogeneous consumption good is produced
using labour as the sole productive input. There is a large population of
potential entrepreneurs in the economy, each of whom chooses whether
to enter the market or not and, if they enter, whether to operate in the
formal or informal sector. Each firm is endowed with potential productivity
θ. The density of θ in the population of potential entrepreneurs is f (θ).
The scale of firms is fixed, but it differs between the informal and formal
sectors of the economy. If a firm operates in the formal sector, it hires 1 unit
of labour and so produces θ units of output. If it operates in the informal
sector, however, a firm hires only (1− s) unit of labour and produces θ(1− s)
units of output, where the scale advantage s may be regarded as reflecting
the greater capital intensity typically observed among firms in the formal
sector. Firms in the two sectors also differ in their ability to evade taxes, to
which we return below.
The representative worker supplies labour and consumes output to max-
imize utility U (c, l ) subject to the budget constraint qc =wl , where q is the
consumer price of output and w the net wage received. Let
L(w/q)= argmaxU (lw/q, l )
be labour supply as a function of the net real wage w/q. Because of taxes,
producer prices of the consumption good and of labour may differ from
prices faced by the worker; let p denote the producer price of output, and
x the net-of-tax price of labour. The consumption good can be imported as
well as produced. The world (border) price is fixed at p∗.
We compare two tax systems: a payroll tax at rate τp and a value added
tax at rate τv . Under the payroll tax, labour used in domestic production
is taxed, so that the gross-of-tax wage paid by firms is x = (1+τp)w . Under
the value added tax, domestic production and imports of the consumption
good are taxed, so that the domestic consumer price is q = (1+τv )p. Gov-
ernment revenues are used to finance purchase of a public good whose
consumption enters additively into workers’ utility, and which is therefore
suppressed from the model for simplicity. Profits of entrepreneurs, defined
below, are likewise consumed through purchases of the consumption good.
Because the economy is a small open economy, demands adjust to ensure
a balance-of-trade equilibrium; that is, purchases of the consumption good
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by workers, entrepreneurs, and government are equal to domestic produc-
tion plus imports at any real wage in the model.
4.1 Tax incidence without informality
To set ideas, start with the case that all firms that operate will operate
in the formal sector. Let the producer price of output be p. Profit of an
entrepreneur of productivity type θ is
pi(θ)= θp−x
if the firm operates, and zero otherwise. Firms therefore operate if pi(θ)≥ 0
or
θ ≥ θ∗ = x
p
Let the proportion of firms with productivity above any threshold z be
G(z)=
∫ ∞
z
f (θ)dθ
Thus G(θ∗) represents both the mass of firms that operates in the economy,
and also the demand for labour, given the real wage paid by firms. Given
the tax system (τp ,τv ), the wage paid in the domestic market adjusts to
clear the labour market, so that
G(x/p)= L(w/q)
The labour market clearing condition, together with the pricing equations
x = (1+τp)w
q = (1+τv )p
characterize the equilibrium in the economy.
Equal tax rate comparisons
Our first results concern the incidence of VAT and payroll taxes at some
common rate τp = τv = τ in the absence of an informal sector. Recall that
under the payroll tax the gross wage paid by firms is x = (1+τ)w . Since
there is no tax on imports or on domestically produced consumption, q =
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p = p∗: domestic consumer and producer prices of the consumption good
equal the exogenous world price. The equilibrium wage with a payroll tax
w¯p therefore solves
G
(
(1+τ)w¯p
p∗
)
= L
(
w¯p
p∗
)
(1)
Under VAT at rate τ, there is no direct tax on wages so that x = w , but
the tax raises the consumer price to q = (1+τ)p. Since VAT applies equally
to domestic and imported consumption goods, p = p∗. The equilibrium
wage under VAT w¯v therefore solves
G
(
w¯v
p∗
)
= L
(
w¯v
(1+τ)p∗
)
(2)
It is immediately obvious from comparing these two expressions that w¯v =
(1+τ)w¯p . Thus we have:
Result 1 In the absence of an informal sector, at equal tax rates τp = τv , a
switch from payroll taxation to value added taxation leaves the real wage paid
by firms and received by workers unchanged. Consequently, the tax reform is
neutral for labour supply, domestic production, and net imports.
Although the payroll tax is an origin-based tax on domestic production,
whereas the value added tax is a destination-based tax on domestic con-
sumption, a switch from payroll to value added taxation causes the real
exchange rate to appreciate, leaving trade unaffected. In this model, such
a tax reform is neutral for international trade, domestic production, and
labour supply.
However, the two taxes are not equivalent in terms of government rev-
enue. Revenue under the payroll tax is
Rp = τw¯p
∫
θ∗
f (θ)dθ
whereas under the VAT it is
Rv = τp∗
∫
θ∗
θ f (θ)dθ
The difference in revenues is
Rv −Rp = τ
∫
θ∗
pi(θ) f (θ)dθ
Since pi(θ)> 0 for all θ > θ∗ we have:
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Result 2 At equal tax rates τp = τv , tax revenue is strictly higher under the
value added tax than under the payroll tax.
This highlights the fact that a value added tax is equivalent to a payroll
tax plus a tax on excess profits of taxable firms. Since in this model profits
are consumed by domestic entrepreneurs, the difference in the two tax
bases may be regarded as either profits or entrepreneurial consumption
– which are exempted under a payroll tax. Thus while the incidence of
the two taxes on wages is the same in the absence of an informal sector,
the value added tax is more progressive because it taxes entrepreneurial
consumption. In this model, the two taxes have identical economic effects.
But since the base of VAT is broader, an equal-revenue shift from payroll
taxation to VAT would permit a reduction in the statutory tax rate, which
in turn would induce a rise in the real wage, and in domestic production
and consumption. In this sense, VAT is both more progressive and more
productive than a payroll tax in a model without informality.
In a richer model, profits of firms may comprise both pure profits to
entrepreneurial fixed factors of production and also quasi-rents to “old”
capital installed at the time the value added tax is introduced. Under a
consumption-VAT expenditures on capital goods are deductible from the
tax base. While we abstract from capital for simplicity in this model, it
should be recognized that revenues even from a strict consumption-VAT
exceed that of a payroll tax over a (long) transition period, because the
value-added base includes returns to old capital.
4.2 The informal sector
We now add the informal sector to the model. Given prices, each en-
trepreneur of type θ now decides whether to produce in the formal sec-
tor, in the informal sector, or to exit the market. All firms in the formal
sector are fully taxable under both the payroll tax and the VAT. Whereas
previously we define profits pi(θ) at producer prices (p,x), it turns out to be
more convenient to measure profits at after-tax prices (q,w). Accordingly,
we define the value added tax rate on a tax-inclusive basis as
Tv = τv
1+τv
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so that the producer price under VAT is p∗ = p = (1−Tv )q. Profits in the
formal sector are then
pi(θ)= (1−Tv )qθ− (1+τp)w
If the firm operates in the informal sector, it suffers the scale penalty s,
but it also evades taxes. We assume that an informal firm may evade all
payroll and value added taxes, and therefore receive q for each unit of
output sold while paying w for each unit of labour hired, in contrast to the
corresponding prices (p,x) faced by formal sector firms. Accordingly, profits
in the informal sector are
p˜i(θ)= (1− s)qθ− (1− s)w
Under these assumptions, the difference in profits in the formal and
informal sectors is
pi(θ)− p˜i(θ)= (s−Tv )qθ− (s+τp)w (3)
Then an entrepreneur θ operates in the formal sector if pi(θ) ≥ p˜i(θ) ≥ 0,
and operates in the informal sector if p˜i(θ) ≥ 0 > pi(θ). Otherwise, the en-
trepreneur chooses not to produce. Assume that
Tv < s
so that the scale disadvantage of informal sector firms exceeds the value
added tax disadvantage of formal sector firms. Then the profit differential
in (3) is increasing in productivity θ, and an entrepreneur of productivity θ
chooses:
the formal sector
the informal sector
no production
 if

θ ≥ s+τps−Tv
w
q = θˆ
θ˜ = wq ≤ θ < θˆ
θ < θ˜
(4)
Thus:
Result 3 The most productive firms operate in the formal sector. Some firms
of intermediate productivity operate in the informal sector whenever the pay-
roll tax or VAT rate is positive, while the least productive firms exit the market.
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Our goal is to analyze how the two tax systems affect equilibrium real
wages and production in the economy; i.e. the incidence and efficiency of
taxes. To simplify notation, let
A(τp ,Tv )=
s+τp
s−Tv
denote the effect of taxes on the threshold productivity level of formal sec-
tor firms; thus θˆ = Aw/q. It follows from (4) that the equilibrium mass
(number) of formal sector producers is
N f =G(θˆ)=G(Aw/q)
and of informal sector producers is
N i =G(θ˜)−G(θˆ)=G(w/q)−G(Aw/q)
Given the real net wage w/q and the scale disadvantage s, the aggregate
demand for labour by domestic producers is
Ld (w/q)= (1− s)[G(w/q)−G(Aw/q)]+G(Aw/q)=G(w/q)+ sG(Aw/q)
Combining these expressions, we can solve for the equilibrium real net
wage w¯/q that clears the labour market under any tax system (τp ,Tv ), i.e.
G(w¯/q)+ sG[A(τp ,Tv )(w¯/q)]= L(w¯/q) (5)
This condition, together with the pricing condition p = (1−Tv )q, fully char-
acterizes the equilibium real wage for any payroll or value-added tax sys-
tem.
Comparing tax systems
We now turn to the comparison between a payroll tax at rate τp = τ and a
VAT at the equivalent tax inclusive rate Tv = τ/(1+τ).
It is evident from (5) that the incidence of the two taxes on equilibrium
wages depends only on the tax term A(τp ,Tv ), which determines the thresh-
old productivity at which firms operate in the formal or informal sectors of
the economy – and thus determines the size of the economic distortion
caused by the tax system. We define
Ap(τ)= A(τ,0)= s+τ
s
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as the tax distortion under the payroll tax, and
Av (τ)= A(0,τ/(1+τ))= s
s−τ/(1+τ)
as the corresponding tax distortion under the value added tax. The labour
market equilibrium conditions under the two taxes are then
G(w¯p/qp)+ sG[Ap(τ)(w¯p/qp)]= L(w¯p/qp) (6)
under the payroll tax, and
G(w¯v/qv )+ sG[Av (τ)(w¯v/qv )]= L(w¯v/qv ) (7)
under the value added tax, where it is understood that the consumer price
is qp = p∗ under the payroll tax, and qv = (1+τ)p∗ under the value added
tax.
It may be easily verified that
Ap(τ)< Av (τ) for all τ> 0
Since G is decreasing in its argument and labour supply L is increasing in
the real wage, it follows from (6)–(7) that
w¯p
qp
> w¯v
qv
for all τ> 0
Furthermore, since the residual supply of labour to the formal sector
Lr (w/q)= L(w/q)− (1− s)G(w/q)= s−1[L(w/q)−G(w/q)]
is increasing in the net real wage w/q, and the supply of and demand for
labour in the formal sector must be equal in equilibrium, it follows that
N fp =G[Ap(τ)(w¯p/qp)]>G[Av (τ)(w¯/qv )]=N fv
Collecting these results:
Result 4 Compared to a payroll tax at rate τ, in the presence of informality
a value added tax at rate τ results in:
• a lower real net wage paid to workers;
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• a smaller formal sector and a larger informal production sector.
Aggregate domestic production may be either smaller or larger under the pay-
roll tax, depending on the magnitude of the scale disadvantage of informal
producers.
The result is illustrated in Figure 1, which depicts the residual labour
supply function of the formal sector Lr and the labour demand functions
of the formal sector under the two tax systems. Since Ap < Av , the formal
sector demand for labour under the payroll tax exceeds that of the equiva-
lent value added tax at all real wage rates, implying that the real wage rate
and the size of the formal sector is larger under the payroll tax. The reason
is that the value added tax is imposed on entrepreneurial profit as well as
on payroll, which creates an additional incentive for firms to move to the
informal sector under the VAT compared to the payroll tax.
While the VAT is in this sense more distortionary than the payroll tax,
the revenue comparisons of Result 2 still hold without change in the pres-
ence of an informal sector, implying that the VAT raises more revenue than
the payroll tax at the same tax rate. This highlights the tradeoff between
the greater reach of the VAT and the associated greater incentives for infor-
mality, consistent with the issues emphasized by Emran and Stiglitz (2005).
Is VAT more efficient than payroll taxation?
A more useful comparison is therefore between a payroll tax at rate τ and
a value added tax at a tax-inclusive rate T ∗ that yields the same economic
effects. Observe from (6)–(7) that the market clearing real wage is the
same under the two tax systems if and only if
s
s−T ∗ = s+τs
or
T ∗ = sτ
s+τ (8)
When a payroll tax at rate τ is replaced by a VAT at tax-inclusive rate T ∗,
the real wage is unchanged, and so is the size of the formal sector N f =
G(Aw/q) and of the informal sector N i =G(w/q)−G(Aw/q).
Revenue under the two tax systems is
Rv = T ∗q
∫
θˆ
θ f (θ)dθ
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and
Rp = τw
∫
θˆ
f (θ)dθ
The ratio of tax revenues is therefore
Rv
Rp
= T
∗
τ
q
w
E(θ|θ > θˆ)
= s
s+τ
q
w
E(θ|θ > θˆ)
= E(θ|θ > θˆ)
θˆ
In the above derivation, the first equality shows that the comparison of
tax revenues under equivalent payroll tax and VAT systems depends on the
average profitability of labour in the formal sector. This is as expected,
since the VAT is levied on value added in the formal sector, whereas the
payroll tax is on wages in the formal sector. The second equality follows
from the definition (8) of the equivalent VAT rate T ∗, and the third from
the definition (4) of the marginally profitable firm in the formal sector θˆ.
Since E(θ|θ > θˆ) ≥ θˆ for any distribution of productivities, it follows that
Rv ≥ Rp , with strict inequality whenever the distribution has positive mass
above the threshold θˆ. Thus we have:20
Result 5 For any payroll tax rate τ, there exists a value-added tax rate T ∗
that results in:
• the same real wage paid to labour,
• the same level of production in the formal and informal sectors, but
• higher tax revenues paid to government.
Our analysis highlights the tradeoff between higher revenues from tax-
ing profit under the VAT, but correspondingly greater incentives for firms
to switch to the informal sector. It turns out that this tradeoff is unambigu-
ous. Beginning from a payroll tax at rate τ, there exists a lower value added
tax rate T ∗ at which the taxes paid by the marginal formal sector firm are
unchanged from the payroll tax equilibrium, so that the size of the formal
20It may easily be verified that T ∗ < s for all τ, as required for Result 3.
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and informal sectors is unchanged as well. Since the value added tax levies
higher taxes on the pure profit of inframarginal formal sector firms than
the payroll tax, aggregate tax revenue is unambiguously higher under the
VAT than the payroll tax with equivalent economic effects.
The magnitude of the welfare gains from VAT finance depend on the dis-
tribution of productivities in the population of formal sector firms, which
drives the magntiude of inframarginal rents that are partially captured
through VAT. To illustrate, suppose that productivity follows the Pareto dis-
tribution with parameter k > 0 above a lower bound θ = 1. Then the density
function is
f (θ)= kθ−k−1 θ > 1
The complement of the cumulative distribution function is
G(θ)= θ−k θ > θ0
The average productivity of formal sector firms is
E(θ|θ > θˆ)= kθˆ
k−1
The ratio of tax revenues under VAT and payroll taxation is
Rv
Rp
= k
k−1 = Eθ
Thus, in the Pareto case, the revenue advantage of value added taxation is
proportional to the average productivity in the population of firms in the
economy.
4.3 Discussion
Our goal in this section has been to present a simple yet precise framework,
of special relevance to economies where the potential for tax evasion may
be high, in which the effects of labour and value added taxes may be com-
pared. Our analysis of tax incidence shows that the differences between the
two tax bases are smaller than they may first appear. While a payroll tax
is an origin-based tax on production and the VAT a destination-based tax
on consumption, this difference has no real effects in our model, because
taxable commodities are traded internationally, and real wages adjust to
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offset the effects of the two taxes on “competitiveness”. A more complete
theory would incorporate taxes on non-tradable as well as tradable goods,
which would admit some differences in the effect of the two taxes on ex-
ternal trade, but previous research has shown these differences to be small
in any case.
In our model, a more important difference is that the base of the VAT
is broader, encompassing entrepreneurial profit and, over a long transition
period, quasi-rents to “old” capital investments, as well as labour costs. The
broader base of the VAT permits the same revenue to be raised at a lower
statutory tax rate, implying a lower excess burden of taxation. It is also apt
to be more equitable, in the sense that a shift from labour taxation to VAT
shifts real income from entrepreneurs to workers.
These considerations become more complex when incentives for infor-
mality are considered. At first blush, it seems clear that, despite its positive
effect on revenues, a move from payroll taxation to VAT will also move pro-
duction to the informal sector, because of the additional tax on profitable
formal sector firms under VAT. In spite of this tradeoff between revenues
and efficiency of the tax, we show that there exists a revenue-neutral re-
form from payroll taxation to VAT that increases national output and wel-
fare in the model. Since most entrepreneurial profits are inframarginal,
adoption of a VAT permits a lower statutory tax rate to be levied than un-
der payroll taxation, so that incentives for informality can be controlled,
and higher tax revenues are generated in a less costly way.
Our model thus generates clear empirical predictions: in the model, a
revenue-neutral move from payroll taxation to VAT generates less informal-
ity, higher wages, and an improvement in the balance of trade. There is as
yet no direct evidence on the real world effects of such reforms in the de-
veloping world, but the results from cross-country studies are informative.
Keen and Lockwood (2010) suggest that if VAT is more efficient than the
taxes it replaces, then tax revenues should rise as as percentgae of GDP
following introduction of VAT. In fact, there is generally no association be-
tween VAT adoption and revenues, except in very low income countries,
where there is a small decline. Desai and Hines (2005) examine the impact
of the VAT on international trade in a cross-section of countries, finding
that existence of VAT is associated with lower openness to trade, particu-
larly for low and middle income countries. While this evidence is far from
conclusive, it is not in consistent with the predictions of the model.
In order to focus on essentials, a number of simplifying assumptions
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are being made. We have assumed that both VAT and payroll taxes may
be fully evaded by firms in the informal sector. If there were differences
in the ability of firms to evade the two taxes, our results would change
in obvious ways. In particular, an often-cited advantage of VAT is that it
is levied on a refundable basis on material inputs to production, which
means that even tax-evading firms pay some tax, to the extent that it is
embedded in their own input costs. This reduces the incentives for VAT
evasion in a way that has no parallel for payroll taxes. We abstract from
this issue. Second, we assume that there is no tax enforcement, so that the
expected penalty for evasion is zero. Incorporating enforcement would not
change our qualitative results, as long as the enforcement technology is the
same for the two taxes. In principle, VAT has enforcement advantages over
payroll taxation, because invoices may be checked. Although there is some
evidence supporting this conclusion, the importance of this difference in
practice is largely an open question.
A useful extension would be to consider the effects of VAT taxes on inter-
mediate inputs. The conventional story is that incentives for tax evasion are
weaker under an invoice-and-credit VAT than other taxes, because the “VAT
chain effect” creates incentives for registered traders to do business with
other registered traders. Consistent with this, De Paula and Sheinkman
(2009) find that informal businesses are more likely to have informal sup-
pliers and customers, a result that is consistent with the VAT chain effect
on tax evasion.
5 Concluding Remarks
It is a long way from the simple model of section 4 to the complex world
of tax-financed social insurance in Latin America described earlier in this
paper. The issues emphasized in the model are nonetheless at the core
of the debate over practical policy concerns, and they should inform the
quantitative research over policy options for Latin America. On the whole,
the results derived from the model provide some support for the concern
Levy (2008) and others have expressed about extending payroll tax finance
of social insurance, and of broader social protection programs, in coun-
tries with significant informal sectors. The issue is far from a simple one,
and close examination of the specific context is obviously required in every
country. Nevertheless, our analysis highlights a number of key factors that
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favour incremental financing of social insurance through a broad-based tax
like VAT in Latin America in place of expansion of the payroll tax.
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Table 1. Contribution Rates for Social Security and VAT Rates, Selected Countries, 2009 (percent) 
 
Country (1) 
Insured 
person 
(2) 
Employer 
(3) 
Share 
Levied on 
Employer 
(4) 
Total 
Payroll 
Taxes
 
(5) 
“Labor 
Tax 
TTR” 
(6) 
Standard 
VAT Rate 
Argentina  17 23 58 40 29.4 21 
Bolivia 10 10 50 20 15.5 13 
Brazil 8 21 72 29 41.3 37 
Chile 18 3 14 21 3.8 19 
Colombia 8 37 82 45 33.9 16 
Costa Rica 9 17 63 27 29.3 13 
Dominican 
Republic 
6 14 70 20 17.8 16 
Ecuador 9 10 53 19 13.7 12 
El Salvador 9 12 57 21 17.2 13 
Guatemala 5 9 64 14 14.3 16 
Honduras 4 7 64 11 10.7 12 
Mexico 1 7 88 8 26.7 16 
Nicaragua 6 15 68 22 19.2 15 
Panama 8 12 60 20 22.6 7 
Paraguay 9 14 61 23 18.6 10 
Peru 10 10 50 20 11.0 18 
Uruguay 18 12 40 30 15.6 22 
Venezuela 4 14 78 18 18.1 12 
Average 9 14 61 23 21.6 16 
Sources and notes: Columns (1) – (4) rounded from data in Social Security Administration (2010); may 
not add to total; column (3) is the ratio of column (2) to column (4).  Column (5), the “ labor tax TTR” is 
employers’ payroll taxes as percent of commercial profits calculated for a hypothetical firm as estimated 
in World Bank (2011). Column (6) is based on KPMG (2010); different contributions are included for 
different countries in many cases; similarly, while the VAT rate in most countries is the standard rate 
applying to most transactions, in Brazil the figure shown is only an approximation.to the average rate, 
given the different state rates and the different bases of the various federal and state taxes. Averages are 
unweighted. 
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Table 2. Taxes and Social Security Spending 2008, as percent of GDP, Selected countries 
 
Country (1) 
Taxes 
 
(2) 
VAT 
 
(3) 
Income 
Taxes 
 
 
(4) 
Share 
of 
Income 
Taxes  
From 
CIT  
(%) 
(5) 
Social 
Security 
Contributions 
(6) 
Social 
Security 
Spending 
 
(7) 
Share of 
SS 
funded 
by 
Payroll 
Levies 
(%) 
(8) 
Share of 
General 
Tax 
Revenue 
Needed to 
Fund SS 
(%) 
Argentina  18.1 3.8 2.8 67** 4.2 9.5* 44 38 
Bolivia 20.8 10.0 4.0 95 1.8 4.4* 41 14 
Brazil 24.0 4.9 7.9 52 7.7 13.4 58 34 
Chile 19.9 8.9 7.2 90 1.4 6.4 22 8 
Colombia 15.5 5.7 5.1 -- 2.0 7.1 28 35 
Costa Rica 15.6 6.0 4.4 84 0.3 5.6 5 9 
Dominican 
Republic 
15.0 4.7 3.7 46 0.0 1.3* 0 -- 
Ecuador 16.0 5.2 4.3 74** 3.9 2.4* -- -- 
El 
Salvador 
14.6 6.6 4.5 59** 1.6 0.0* -- -- 
Guatemala 11.5 5.5 3.3 85** 0.2 1.1 18 7 
Honduras 16.2 6.2 5.0 70** 1.2 0.3* -- -- 
Mexico 9.8 3.8 5.2 52** 1.6 3.7 -- -- 
Nicaragua 22.1 7.4 5.8 61 4.1 -- -- -- 
Panama 16.5 2.3 4.7 43 5.7 6.0* 95 3 
Paraguay 13.0 6.1 2.1 100 1.2 2.9 41 14 
Peru 17.2 6.1 6.7 78 1.8 3.2 56 9 
Uruguay 24.2 8.6 4.7 56 6.4 11.0 58 25 
Venezuela 14.3 4.7 6.9 45 0.8 4.6* 18 28 
Average 18.5 5.5 3.6 68                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             2.6 4.9 37 19
 
Sources and notes:   Columns (1) – (6): calculated from data in CEPALSTAT data base available at 
www.eclac.cl.  Central government only (note that in Brazil an additional 8% of GDP is collected by 
subnational VAT). Taxes include social security contributions. Social security spending data in column 
(6) for countries marked by asterisk from Ferreira and Robalino (2010); it is not always for same year.  
Similarly, CIT share in column (4) for countries marked with double asterisk from Jimenez, Gomez 
Sabaini and Podesta (2010) is for varying years in the early 2000s; in many countries some income tax 
revenues are not allocated either to corporations or persons. Column (7) is calculated from data in 
columns (5) and (6); since not all these numbers are from same source, these figures are only very rough 
estimates in some cases. Column (8) is calculated as the ratio of the share of SS not funded by 
contributions.  These figures are calculated as column (7) divided by the difference between column (1) 
and column (5); again, for the reasons just noted, the results are at best only a rough approximation. 
Averages (for countries for which values are shown) are unweighted. 
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Table 3. Some Economic Characteristics, Selected Countries 
 
Country (1) 
GDP 
Per capita 
($US) 
(2) 
Gini 
coefficient 
(3) 
Poverty 
Headcount 
(4) 
Social 
Security  
Coverage 
(% of employed) 
(5) 
Informal 
Economy 
(% of GDP) 
(6) 
Imputed 
VAT 
Base 
(% GDP) 
(7) 
Imputed 
PRT 
Base 
(% GDP) 
Argentina  8,593 50.4 14.2 56.0 32.9 18 11 
Bolivia 3,402 61.7 43.5 14.5 -- 76 9 
Brazil 8,010 58.8 27.4 47.8 28.4 35 46 
Chile 10,810 55.2 9.1 64.9 32.1 47 6 
Colombia 6,521 57.2 37.8 26.0 43.5 36 4 
Costa Rica 8,096 45.8 14.7 65.3 -- 46 1 
Dominican Republic 5,925 51.0 15.8 44.7 44.8 29 0 
Ecuador 5,879 56.0 46.8 32.3 50.7 43 20 
El Salvador 5,350 51.9 29.7 32.9 36.4 51 8 
Guatemala 4,011 54.2 34.6 17.8 42.3 34 1 
Honduras 2,969 54.5 41.8 -- -- 52 11 
Mexico 11,905 53.8 20.2 55.1 28.2 24 20 
Nicaragua 2.132 50.2 47.5 18.3 64.4 49 19 
Panama 8,070 56.5 28.6 53.8 44.4 33 28 
Paraguay 3,715 56.2 27.5 13.5 68.2 61 5 
Peru 5,637 48.9 25.6 13.0 38.1 34 9 
Uruguay 7,942 43.0 3.3 63.8 36.2 39 21 
Venezuela 8,689 44.0 30.6 61.5 43.0 39 4 
Average 6,536 52.7 27.7 40.1 42.2 41 12 
 
Sources and notes: Columns (1) - (3) for early 2000s from Ferreira and Robalino (2010).  Column (4) from Economic Commission for Latin 
America (2006) for social security coverage (based on survey data for different years in early 2000s, and defined somewhat differently in various 
countries but usually proportion paying some SI contributions; for Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay figure is for urban areas only); the coverage 
figure for Colombia is based on Clavijo (2009).  Column (5) estimates (for early 2000s) from Vuletin (2008).  Columns (6) - (7) are rough 
estimates of the actual tax bases reached by these taxes; the figures are calculated simply by dividing the revenue figures in columns (2) and (5) of 
Table 2 by the rates in columns (6) and (4), respectively, of Table 1. Averages, for countries for which values are shown, are unweighted. 
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Figure 1: Wages and the formal sector under alternative tax bases
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